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Should Consistency Be Part of the Reform 
Prosecutor’s Playbook? 
 




In this piece, I explore the value of consistency in a prosecutor’s office 
that is committed to racial justice, fiscal responsibility, and strategies to 
reduce the size of the carceral state. I argue that consistency of process, rather 
than consistency of outcome, is the principal value that leadership ought to 
embrace in furtherance of its reformist goals.  In prioritizing consistency of 
process, the office would design a “prosecutorial calculus” to guide line 
prosecutors’ case management decisions (i.e., it would identify the factors 
that should influence whether and what to file, how to handle pre-trial 
release, and what to offer as a plea deal).  The calculus would also shape the 
formation and maintenance of relationships with the bar and with law 
enforcement.  All prosecutors within a given office should follow the 
calculus, irrespective of team or unit assignment. Prosecutors in other 
offices, however, will fall outside of its reach due to strong localist 
headwinds and entrenched political realities.  In emphasizing consistency of 
process, I suggest that prosecutors ought to foreground the meaningful 
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Introduction 
 
In the past decade, new ideas about prosecution have emerged onto the 
criminal justice landscape with much fanfare.1  While progressive-minded 
prosecutors have won elections mainly in urban locales such as Chicago, 
Philadelphia, Houston, Dallas, San Francisco, Seattle, and several of the 
boroughs of New York City, “reformer DAs”2 have also triumphed in places 
like Kansas City, Kansas; Winnebago County, Wisconsin; and Jacksonville, 
Florida.3  These electoral victories signal that the urge for a more 
compassionate and more fiscally sound approach4 to criminal justice policy 
extends beyond coastal, urban elites.  Relatedly, sustained media focus on 
police-involved shootings, as well as popular podcasts like “Serial” and “In 
the Dark,” appear to have both fueled and reflected a popular desire to 
rethink how we do justice in this country. 
The term “reform prosecution” seems to represent more of a continuum 
than a defined policy agenda; accordingly, elected prosecutors who self-
identify as “progressive” or “reformist” have promised to make a number of 
changes in the standard prosecution approach.5  At the front end, they have 
focused on shifting enforcement priorities—like removing resources from 
low-level crimes in order to concentrate on offenses that are more serious. 
For example, Larry Krasner, the District Attorney of Philadelphia, and Kim 
Foxx, the State’s Attorney for Cook County (Chicago), have declared that 
 
 1. Emily Bazelon & Miriam Krinsky, There’s a new wave of prosecutors. And they 
mean justice, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/opinion/ 
how-local-prosecutors-can-reform-their-justice-systems.html. 
 2. See, e.g., Justin Miller, The New Reformer DAs, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Jan 2, 
2018), https://prospect.org/health/new-reformer-das/. In this article, I am adopting the 
“reformer” moniker rather than the “progressive” moniker to embrace those prosecutors who 
do not identify as politically progressive but who do support reducing the size of the carceral 
state and exercising fiscal responsibility in criminal justice. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See generally RIGHT ON CRIME, http://www.rightoncrime.com (last visited Mar. 20, 
2020) (discussing conservative approaches to prosecution that focus on the skyrocketing costs 
of incarceration). 
 5. See, e.g., Allan Smith, Progressive DAs are Shaking Up the Criminal Justice System. 
Pro-Police Groups Aren’t Happy, NBC NEWS (Aug 19, 2019), https://www.nbcnews. 
com/politics/justice-department/these-reform-prosecutors-are-shaking-system-pro-police-gr 
oups-aren-n1033286 (”Progressive, reform-minded prosecutors have taken the reins in top 
local prosecutor roles across the country that have allowed them to begin to change the 
criminal justice system from the inside out.”); Maurice Chammach, These Prosecutors 
Campaigned for Less Jail Time – and Won, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 9, 2016), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/11/09/these-prosecutors-campaigned-for-less-jail-
time-and-won.  See generally EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO 
TRANSFORM AMERICAN PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION (2019). 
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their respective offices will handle thefts of low value property as 
misdemeanors rather than felonies.6  Suffolk County (Boston), 
Massachusetts District Attorney Rachael Rollins has likewise instructed her 
line prosecutors to decline to prosecute a list of fifteen low-level crimes and 
to divert those offenders into community-based services.7  Seattle’s Law 
Enforcement Assisted Diversion program (of which the prosecutor’s office 
is a prominent partner) similarly diverts many of those arrested for 
prostitution and low-level drug offenses even before booking.8 
Front-end reforms also seek to reduce rates of pre-trial incarceration. 
Larry Krasner ended the practice of requiring cash bail for low-level offenses 
in 2018, causing no negative impact on the rates of recidivism or failures to 
appear.9  Eric Gonzalez, the District Attorney of Brooklyn, has required his 
prosecutors to give a reason for demanding bail in any misdemeanor case, 
thereby reversing the presumption against release on one’s own 
recognizance.10  Gonzalez also took the lead on reducing consequences for 
 
 6. Steve Schmadeke, Top Cook County Prosecutor Raising Bar for Charging 
Shoplifters with Felony, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Dec 15, 2016), https://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
news/breaking/ct-kim-foxx-retail-theft-1215-20161214-story.html; see generally BAZELON, 
supra note 5. See also Memorandum from Larry Krasner, District Attorney, Philadelphia 
District Attorney’s Office to Assistant District Attorneys (Mar. 13, 2018) (instructing his 
attorneys not to charge marijuana possession, regardless of weight, not to charge sex workers 
who have fewer than three convictions, and to offer more diversion before plea entry) (cited 
in BAZELON, supra note 5, at 165 and at 368, note 165). Nueces County, Texas, prosecutor 
Mark Gonzalez similarly instructed his attorneys not to file low level marijuana possession 
cases. Lauren-Brooke Eisen & Miriam Krinsky, The Necessity of Performance Measures for 
Prosecutors, OXFORD HANDBOOK ON PROSECUTORS AND PROSECUTION (Ronald F. Wright, 
Kay L. Levine and Russell Gold eds.) Chapter 11 (forthcoming 2021) (on file with author). 
 7. Memorandum from Rachael Rollins, Suffolk County District Attorney, The Rachael 
Rollins Policy Memo at D-1 (March 2019), http://files.suffolkdistrictattorney.com/The-
Rachael-Rollins-Policy-Memo.pdf. 
 8. Nicole Jennings, Prosecutor Dan Satterberg says LEAD program expansion will get 
people off drugs, KIRO RADIO (Sept. 12, 2018), https://mynorthwest.com/1111041/dan-
satterberg-lead-program/?. 
 9. Aureilie Ouss & Megan Stevenson, Bail, Jail and Pre-trial Misconduct, GEORGE 
MASON LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER, LS-19-08 (2020). 
 10. Bail reform initiatives have been harder to implement than charging initiatives, as 
the imposition of bail is ultimately dependent on agreement from the judge, not the elected 
prosecutor’s policy alone. Id. (discussing influence of both line prosecutor and courtroom 
judge on actual bail outcomes); see also RECLAIM CHICAGO ET AL. IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE FOR 
ALL: AN EVALUATION OF KIM FOXX’S FIRST YEAR IN OFFICE (2018), https://www. 
thepeopleslobbyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Equal-Justice-for-All-A-Report-on-Ki 
m-Foxxs-First-Year-ForPrint.pdf (noting that Chicago’s new bail initiatives were offered only 
to a small percentage of defendants compared to Kim Foxx’s campaign promises); Newly 
elected reform District Attorney Chesa Boudin in San Francisco, California, also recently 
announced a no cash-bail policy, Evan Sernoffsky, San Francisco DA Chesa Boudin end cash 
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non-citizen, undocumented defendants and on supporting the campaign to 
close the jail at Riker’s Island.11 
On the back end, reform prosecutors sometimes seek to mitigate or 
reverse the harmful effects of conviction for some offenders.  For example, 
newly elected prosecutors have established and funded conviction integrity 
units in their own offices, offering to work with defense attorneys and 
Innocence Projects to investigate allegations of wrongful convictions.12 
Others have sought to reduce incarceration terms for juveniles originally 
sentenced to life without parole.13  San Francisco has taken even greater 
initiative.  Under the leadership of George Gascón, the former District 
Attorney of San Francisco, prosecutors and prison inmates at San Quentin 
State Prison began holding regular meetings to give prosecutors a better 
understanding of life behind bars and to facilitate reentry for prisoners. 
Gascón also created the Formerly Incarcerated Advisory Board, to help 
establish channels for former inmates to rejoin the workforce, the housing 
market, and educational environments.14 
With all of these new programs underway, this is an exciting time in 
criminal justice, to be sure. But one question has been left largely 
unanswered by the literature about reform prosecution15 and by reform 
 
bail for all criminal cases, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.sfchronicle.com/ 
crime/article/San-Francisco-DA-Chesa-Boudin-ends-cash-bail-for-14996400.php. 
 11. BAZELON, supra note 5. Kate Ryan, Collateral Consequences: Brooklyn DA seeks to 
Protect Immigrant Defendants from Deportation, WNYC (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www. 
wnyc.org/story/collateral-consequences-brooklyn-da-seeks-protect-immigrant-defendants-d 
eportation/. 
 12. Inger H. Chandler, Conviction Integrity Review Units, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Summer 
2016 (noting the achievements of the longest running CIU, in Dallas, Texas).  In 2007, there 
were only two conviction integrity units in the United States; today there are approximately 
40 (Eisen, supra note 6); 
CIUs have been responsible for dozens of exonerations across the country since they were 
formed; in 2015 alone there were 60 exonerations by CIUs and in 2016 there were 70.  Most 
of those came from Harris County, Texas. Barry C. Scheck, Conviction Integrity Units 
Revisited, 14 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 705, 705 n. 2 (2017). 
 13. BAZELON, supra note 5, at 163–64 (describing the work of Larry Krasner in 
Philadelphia and Kim Foxx in Chicago). 
 14. Press Release, Office of District Attorney George Gascón, DA Gascón Teams Up 
with Code for America to Automatically Reduce Eligible Marijuana Convictions in San 
Francisco and Beyond (May 15, 2018), https://sfdistrictattorney.org/da-gasc%C3%B3n-
teams-code-america-automatically-reduce-eligible-marijuana-convictions-san-francisco. 
 15. See, e.g., David Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 UC DAVIS 
L. REV. 25 (2017) (articulating a list of 10 priorities for progressive prosecutors); FAIR AND 
JUST PROSECUTION, 21 PRINCIPLES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY PROSECUTOR (2018), https://www. 
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/FJP_21Principles_FINAL.pdf (providing a 
series of guiding principles and recommendations to reduce incarceration and promote 
fairness). 
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prosecutors themselves: what is the role of consistency in the reform 
prosecutor’s office?  Aside from implementing bold new policies in a 
consistent manner, should the reform prosecutor pay attention to consistency 
within her own office more generally? 
While Lon Fuller famously observed in 1964 that consistency was one 
of the core principles essential to keeping law from perpetrating the worst of 
injustices,16 for years observers of state-level criminal justice systems in the 
United States have noted that consistency gets short shrift in the list of 
criminal justice values.17  State and local prosecutors tend to make their own 
decisions within fairly small working groups, leading to significant 
disparities even when applying the same formal law as other prosecutors.18 
Indeed, the American version of localism in criminal justice goes beyond 
simply federalism—localism has generated variation at the county level, at 
the courtroom level, and even at the prosecutor level.  Should correcting for 
that lack of consistency feature on the reform prosecutor’s agenda? 
I believe the answer is yes.  Modern leaders ought to identify 
consistency as an important, even foundational value of the prosecutor’s 
office.  After all, the vision of new, 21st century prosecutorial leadership—
to make lasting and meaningful changes in the justice system—can only be 
accomplished if all prosecutors working within an office are rowing in the 
same direction.  Otherwise, change will be haphazard, or ad hoc, dependent 
on whether a particular employee feels like going along with the program. In 
short, to borrow from Stephanos Bibas, chief prosecutors need to create an 
office environment that “hires for, inculcates, expects and rewards … 
consistency.”19  In such an office, all prosecutors pay attention to a collective 
vision when making decisions about their cases; it is part of the culture, and 
it becomes part of the metric of individual and office success. 
But it is not enough to embrace consistency of vision as an overarching 
principle. In order to achieve this vision, we must first establish some 
 
 16. See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). 
 17. David Johnson, The Organization of Prosecution and the Possibility of Order, 32  
L. & SOC’Y REV. 247, 248–252 (1998). 
 18. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, Persistent Localism in the Prosecutorial Services of 
North Carolina, 41 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 211-264 (2012). This lack of 
attention to consistency separates American prosecutors from many of their counterparts 
around the world, and particularly from prosecutors who work under a central ministry that 
guides hiring, promotion and training of a nation’s prosecutorial workforce.  Rasmas Wandall, 
Hiring and Learning Strategies in Prosecution Services, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON 
PROSECUTORS AND PROSECUTION (Ronald F. Wright, Kay L. Levine and Russell Gold eds.) 
Chapter 10 (forthcoming 2021) (on file with author); Johnson, supra note 17 (describing the 
procuracy in Japan). 
 19. Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 959, 963 (2009). 
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baselines for what we mean by consistency.  First, consistency of what: 
consistency of outcomes or consistency of process?  A focus on consistency 
of outcomes spotlights the final decisions that prosecutors make in their cases 
(bail recommendations, charging, plea offers, and so forth), whereas a focus 
on consistency of process spotlights the decision-making process that 
prosecutors use to get to those outcomes.20  What factors should they take 
into account?  How ought those factors to be weighed or calibrated?  Under 
what conditions are deviations acceptable?  Secondly, once we conclude that 
we desire more consistency in either outcomes or process, we need to define 
the range of consistency that we seek.  In other words, consistency among 
whom?  Are we asking all prosecutors in the office to think in the same way? 
All prosecutors working in one unit or team to think in the same way?  Or 
all prosecutors working in the same state, across various offices, because 
they are applying the same state criminal laws? 
In this essay, I first argue that consistency of process is the principal 
value that reformers ought to instill in the line prosecutors who work in their 
respective offices.  While a certain degree of outcome consistency might well 
be desirable, outcomes are likely to fall within an acceptable range once the 
leadership articulates and regulates the calculus governing how prosecutors 
think about case management decisions.  Furthermore, even though 
consistency in outcomes may be easier for outsiders to measure, I worry that 
placing an emphasis on identifiable outcomes may inspire a form of 
gamesmanship that betrays the core values of the leadership’s mission.  That 
is, prosecutors might be inclined to manipulate their numbers to appear to be 
in compliance, rather than changing their substantive behavior to comply in 
reality.  In emphasizing consistency of process, I suggest that prosecutors 
ought to foreground the meaningful provision of procedural justice in their 
working lives, and I predict that a measure of outcome consistency is likely 
to follow.21 
In answer to the “consistency among whom?” question, I argue that all 
prosecutors within a given office should follow this calculus, irrespective of 
team or unit assignment, but the drive for consistency ends at the 
jurisdiction’s geographic boundaries.  Prosecutors who work for other 
jurisdictions generally need to comply with the norms of the offices for 
which they work—the elected prosecutor in an adjacent county has no 
 
 20. The seeds of this idea come from work by Don Stemen and Bruce Frederick.  Don 
Stemen & Bruce Frederick, Rules, Resources and Relationships: Contextual Constraints on 
Prosecutorial Decision Making, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1 (2013). 
 21  See generally TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006).  As Tyler explains, 
procedural justice urges that processes and procedures (that lead to outcomes) are themselves 
fair. Fairness in process depends, at the outset, on consistency in decision-making across 
social groups and across prosecutors.  Id. at 6. 
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authority over them.  While consistency across counties would be valuable 
in some areas, the risk that neighboring or distant counties would hold up or 
dilute the reform agenda in a desire to achieve statewide uniformity cautions 
that localism should prevail.  Reform prosecutors ought to share their ideas 
widely, but they need to rely on persuasion rather than might to see them 
implemented outside of their own jurisdictions. 
 
Part I: Consistency Across What?  
Developing the Prosecutorial Calculus 
 
In order to realize the elected prosecutor’s reformist vision, line 
prosecutors ought to follow a certain set of thought processes (what we can 
think of as “the prosecutorial calculus”) when doing their jobs.  This calculus 
would apply primarily when the prosecutor is making decisions about 
whether and what to charge, how much bail to recommend (if any), plea 
offers, and sentencing recommendations after trial.  It should include not just 
which factors to consider, but the weight each of those factors ought to 
receive in the vast majority of cases and the treatment of exceptions.  The 
calculus should also provide guidance to prosecutors in their construction 
and maintenance of relationships with the defense bar, judiciary, and law 
enforcement.  The reform prosecutor envisions a richer dialogue between 
prosecutors and their colleagues in other divisions of the justice system as 
essential to prevent instances of wrongful conviction, over-charging, and 
over-sentencing, but such dialogue can only emerge if relationships 
incorporate a sense of trust and integrity from the start. 
 
A.  What Would a Coordinated Decision-Making Process Entail?  
 
Can a decisional calculus be collective, rather than merely individual? 
It can. Criminologists studying prosecutors’ offices have long observed that, 
when it comes to filing charges and making plea offers, certain offices tend 
to adopt or foreground certain strategies.  For example, Mellon, Jacoby, and 
Brewer22 identified four distinctive office-wide models of charging in their 
study of ten prosecutor offices: legal sufficiency, system efficiency, trial 
efficiency, and defendant rehabilitation. In a unit guided by legal sufficiency, 
prosecutors examine police reports to determine whether there is proof to 
satisfy all of the legal elements of the crime. In an office guided by system 
efficiency, prosecutors look beyond the legal elements to consider whether 
 
 22. Leonard R. Mellon et al., The Prosecutor Constrained by His Environment: A New 
Look at Discretionary Justice in the United States, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 52, 60–68 
(1981). 
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cases have the potential for speedy and early resolution.23  Where trial 
sufficiency is the guiding principle, the prosecutor also assesses the likely 
success of the case at trial before finalizing whether and how to charge a 
case.  And lastly, offices that focus on defendant rehabilitation look for 
opportunities to divert an offender out of the justice system entirely.  While 
sometimes these approaches work in tandem, typically attorneys responsible 
for filing cases see one approach as paramount, and the choice of one policy 
over another influences how many cases are accepted for prosecution at the 
outset. 
Institutional office patterns also influence compliance with Brady 
disclosure mandates.  For instance, in one study of seven state-level 
prosecutor offices, Ellen Yaroshefsky and Bruce Green documented office-
level variation in attitudes toward prosecutorial disclosure obligations.24 
They concluded, “[W]hen it comes to pre-trial disclosure, the principal 
influences on prosecutors’ decision making are likely to be organizational 
factors.”25  In other words, an office’s culture and approach to regulating and 
supervising line attorneys heavily supplements the individual prosecutor’s 
own professional values when the prosecutor is deciding how diligently to 
comply with state and federal disclosure rules. Yaroshefsky and Green were 
able to distinguish robust disclosure jurisdictions (many of which had open 
file office policies) from narrow compliance jurisdictions, where individual 
prosecutors assumed much more autonomy when making the disclosure 
decision. In the latter, as the “narrow” moniker suggests, liberal disclosure 
was not the common practice; this behavior reflected and reinforced a 
heightened sense of adversarialism with the local defense bar.26  Moreover, 
junior prosecutors were discouraged from making broader disclosures by 
senior prosecutors on a regular basis.27 
Here it is not my purpose to articulate the precise set of factors, or their 
relative weight, an office ought to adopt when instructing its prosecutors in 
whether to file a case or to decline, in whether to seek bail, in how to design 
 
 23. The “focal concerns” perspective in criminology adds texture to the system 
efficiency approach. Offices motivated by focal concerns focus on three things when making 
filing decisions and plea offers: (1) the blameworthiness of the offender, (2) the 
dangerousness of the offender, and (3) the practical constraints and consequences for 
offenders and organizations if the case is handled in a certain way.  See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Ulmer 
ET AL., Prosecutorial Discretion and the Imposition of Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 44 J. 
RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 427, 431–52 (2007). 
 24. Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors’ Ethics in Context: Influences on 
Prosecutorial Disclosure, in 269 LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN 
CONTEXT (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds. 2012).  
 25. Id. at 270. 
 26. Id. at 280. 
 27. Id. at 281. 
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plea offers, or in how to manage disclosure.  I am less worried about the risk 
of leveling up28 where the office is under the leadership of a reform-minded 
attorney who is committed to racial justice, to fairness, and to reducing rates 
of incarceration (both pre-trial and post-trial).29  Because the leadership has 
embraced these principles, the baselines agreed upon should be far lower 
than what we see in more regressive or conventional offices.  My point is to 
say that the reform prosecutor ought to decide which approach—or 
combination of approaches—she would like her line prosecutors to adopt, 
and then instruct them on how to make that approach come to life in their 
everyday decision-making.  If consideration of system resources or 
immigration consequences will be important, for example, the leader needs 
to tell prosecutors which resources and consequences merit attention, and at 
what point in their decision-making those resources and consequences 
should exert an influence. 
In calling for reformist prosecutors to insist on consistency in the 
prosecutorial calculus, I am building on factor-based approaches that various 
authorities have advanced to tighten up the prosecutor’s discretion at the time 
of filing.30  The State of Washington provides guidance to its county-level 
prosecutors, for instance, through a statute that contains a non-exhaustive list 
of reasons a prosecutor may choose not to file a case despite evidentiary 
sufficiency.31  That prosecution would be contrary to legislative intent, that 
the statute is antiquated, or that the defendant is pending conviction on 
unrelated charges would all support the decision not to file.32  The National 
District Attorneys Association (NDAA), in its National Prosecution 
Standards manual, likewise articulates several possible grounds to support a 
declination decision, including doubt as to guilt, concern about possible 
improper motives of the victim, and undue hardship caused to the accused.33 
Yet legislative provisions and NDAA guidelines tend to be quite 
generic; they authorize almost any decision a prosecutor would like to make 
 
 28. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 344 (1997). 
 29. See FAIR AND JUST PROSECUTION, supra note 15. 
 30. See, e.g., THE NAT’L DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION 
STANDARDS MANUAL § 4-1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). THE ABA STANDARDS ON THE 
PROSECUTION FUNCTION (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS] likewise 
articulate guidelines for prosecutors to follow when making charging decisions (see, for 
example, standards 3-4.3 and 3-4.4), and instruct that sentencing recommendations ought not 
to be left to the discretion of the individual prosecutor but rather should be guided by clearly 
articulated office policies (see standard 3-7.2(d)). 
 31. WASH. REV. CODE, § 9.94A.411(1). 
 32. Id.  John Pfaff has recently called for legislatures to adopt more specific guidelines 
for prosecutors to follow.  John Pfaff, Prosecutorial Guidelines, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 101, at 101 (Erik Luna ed. 2017). 
 33. See NAT’L DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, supra note 30. 
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in a given case and provide little by way of constraint.  For that reason, they 
are easy to adopt and provoke little resistance in the prosecutorial 
community.  Heartier forms of constraint appear in policies promulgated at 
the office level. The Florida State Attorney’s Office for the Fourth Judicial 
Circuit, for example, recently instituted written policies and procedures to 
ensure the “fair, uniform, efficient and transparent handling of all homicide 
cases by the office.”34  Those procedures include creating a Grand Jury 
Indictment Review Panel to review all cases in which the assigned Assistant 
State Attorney wants to seek an indictment for capital murder.  The goal is 
“to allow proper, individualized consideration of the facts and law relevant 
to each particular case, set within a framework of consistent and event-
handed application of Florida law,” and to curtail the impact of “arbitrary or 
legally impermissible factors” such as race, gender, ethnicity, sexual 
orientation and religion.35  Some reformist DAs have likewise promulgated 
office policies to ensure that their line assistants implement certain criminal 
justice reforms, such as Larry Krasner’s February 2018 memo to his 
Philadelphia prosecutors instructing them to decline to file certain charges 
(in the absence of significant criminal history), to charge lesser rather than 
greater offenses for some crimes, and to be flexible in considering diversion 
for other charges.36 
To be sure, the desire for consistency is not just a state-level enterprise. 
At the federal level, the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations, adopted by the Department of Justice in 2015, is a well-
known effort to guide U.S. Attorneys across the country in their handling of 
white-collar prosecutions against corporate defendants. While the manual 
begins with a focus on general principles, it gives the prosecutor specific 
 
 34. OFFICE OF THE FLORIDA STATE ATT’Y, ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
CIRCUIT, HOMICIDE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES at 6 (2017), https://www.sao4th.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/SAO4th-Annual-Report-2017.pdf. 
This call for more transparent decision-making resonates more broadly, as the MacArthur 
Foundation is supporting a partnership between prosecutors in Chicago, Jacksonville, 
Milwaukee and Tampa to collaborate with researchers at Florida International University and 
Loyola University Chicago.  See Besiki L. Kutateladze et al., Prosecutorial Attitudes, 
Perspectives, and Priorities: Insights from the Inside, CTR. ADMIN. JUSTICE, FLORIDA INT’L 
UNIV. (Dec. 2018), https://caj.fiu.edu/news/2018/prosecutorial-attitudes-perspectives-and-
priorities-insights-from-the-inside/report-1.pdf. 
 35. OFFICE OF THE FLORIDA STATE ATT’Y, ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
CIRCUIT, HOMICIDE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES at 6 (2017), https://www.sao4th.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/SAO4th-Annual-Report-2017.pdf. 
 36. See Memoradum from Larry Krasner to Assistant District Attorneys, supra note 6. 
These principles can also be found in the guide recently published by FAIR AND JUST 
PROSECUTION, supra note 15. 
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factors to consider in order to “proper[ly] treat[] the corporate target” at the 
investigation, charging and plea offer stages.37 
Prosecutorial approaches to process consistency in some ways mirror 
the trend toward structured sentencing that began three or four decades ago. 
Following a period in which indeterminate sentencing schemes were the 
norm and concerns about discrimination surfaced repeatedly, the federal 
government and many states adopted sentencing guidelines to help structure 
the decision-making process used by trial judges in criminal courts.38  The 
respective guidelines that emerged during this period differ in the degree to 
which their provisions are mandatory, but they all identify up front which 
factors judges ought to take into account, and the relative weight of each 
factor, when designing an appropriate sentence post-conviction.39  The 
guidelines and rubrics have rightfully been criticized for levelling up 
baseline sentences too much,40 but they have also been shown to improve 
predictability and transparency and to reduce discrimination between 
similarly situated offenders, at least in the state courts.41 
 
 37. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.000 ET SEQ. (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/jm/title-9-criminal.  The “Factors to be Considered” portion can be 
found in 9-28.300.  Id.  The list is meant to be illustrative, rather than exhaustive. Note that 
office-level policies are not subject to public debate and thus may be underinclusive when it 
comes to concerns that defenders might raise.  See Pfaff, Prosecutorial Guidelines, supra note 
32. Guidelines enacted at the legislative level may have a more comprehensive sweep.  Id.  
The risk of underinclusiveness strikes me as reduced in a reformist office, though, because 
leadership has already publicly committed to enact policies that will reduce incarceration 
rates, increase the number of diversion programs and keep abreast of racial justice concerns. 
 38. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and 
Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1194–96 (2005).  One commentator has 
argued that a “coherent sentencing law system” depends upon “pre-determined rules and 
principles” to replace “idiosyncratic intuitions of sentencers.”  Mirko Bagaric, Consistency 
and Fairness in Sentencing, 2(1) CAL. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 84 (2000). 
 39. See Frase, supra note 38 at 1194-1204.  This phenomenon has not been limited to 
the United States.  The Sentencing Council in the United Kingdom, launched in 2010, is 
responsible for developing sentencing guidelines and monitoring their use, to promote greater 
consistency in sentencing.  See COURTS AND TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, https://www.judiciary.uk/ 
you-and-the-judiciary/sentencing/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2019). 
 40. See Frase, supra note 38 at 1209–1211, (noting that protecting public safety has been 
identified as the primary goal of sentencing commissions, and certain states used their 
guidelines systems explicitly to increase sentence severity for certain crimes but failed to 
consider the costs of that approach).  See also Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, 
Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 
U. CHI. L. REV. 715 (2008).  In reformist offices I am less concerned about the levelling up 
phenomenon because the leadership has rejected the binary between public safety and a 
smaller carceral state.  It therefore should set reasonably low baselines compared to what we 
see in more regressive offices. 
 41. NAT’L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, ASSESSING CONSISTENCY AND FAIRNESS IN 
SENTENCING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN THREE STATES (2008), https://www.ncsc.org/~/ 
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Where inconsistency characterizes the prosecutorial thought calculus at 
different stages of a case (or among different prosecutors working for the 
same office), problems arise: unpredictability, lack of transparency, and 
discrimination among offenders all interfere with the office’s obligation to 
do justice for the defendant and victim populations.  Because the reform 
prosecution platform has already identified those concerns as among the 
most challenging issues in criminal justice, modern prosecutors ought to 
enthusiastically embrace initiatives that can mitigate them.  But in addition 
to these concerns, inconsistency in the prosecutorial calculus can cause 
inefficiency and frustration within the prosecutorial enterprise itself.  Don 
Stemen and Bruce Frederick, for example, found high levels of frustration 
among prosecutors in one Southeastern county; they were encouraged to file 
broadly but then complained that lack of courtroom space prevented them 
from taking cases to trial—which forced them to give fire sale plea offers.42 
A different outcome might have prevailed if system resources factored into 
the filing calculus at the start of the case.43 
 
B.  Which Decisions Would Benefit from Advance Coordination? 
 
Having covered the basics of a coordinated approach to decision-
making in the prosecutor’s office, we can now consider a second-level 
concern in the “consistency about what?” inquiry:  Which decisions ought to 
be subject to the calculus?  In the criminological literature referenced above, 
the relevant prosecutorial thought process concerns only the 
charging/declination decision and the plea offer; it does not seem to extend 
further than those functions.  While theorists recognize that a given approach 
 
media/Microsites/Files/CSI/Assessing%20Consistency.ashx.  But see Amy L. Anderson & 
Cassia Spohn, Lawlessness in the Federal Sentencing Process: A Test for Uniformity and 
Consistency in Sentence Outcomes, 27(3) JUSTICE QUARTERLY 362–393 (2010) (finding that 
even after the imposition of the federal sentencing guidelines in a study of three U.S. district 
courts, many federal judges continued to arrive at decisions regarding the appropriate sentence 
in different ways, by attaching differential weights to several of the legally relevant case 
characteristics and legally irrelevant offender characteristics).  Similar disparities were found 
by Mona Lynch in her recent study of how drug cases were handled in three different federal 
district courts in different parts of the U.S.  See MONA LYNCH, HARD BARGAINS: THE 
COERCIVE POWER OF DRUG LAWS IN FEDERAL COURT (2016).  Lynch’s study draws our 
attention to prosecutorial choices and prioritizes in each district, rather than to exercises of 
judicial discretion. 
 42. Stemen & Frederick, supra note 20, at 46–47.  The county that was the subject of 
this study was kept anonymous for purposes of confidentiality. 
 43. Such was the approach taken by the New Orleans District Attorney’s Office about 
two decades ago, when the leadership adopted tighter filing standards to dramatically reduce 
plea bargaining.  Ronald F. Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55(1) 
STANFORD L. REV. 29 (2002). 
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to filing or plea offers often has consequences for prosecutorial relationships 
with the defense bar and with local law enforcement,44 the calculus does not 
explicitly reach that far.  But what if “relationships” were a piece of the 
calculus itself, instead of just a dependent variable subject to influence by 
different approaches to filing and plea practices?  If we were to elevate 
professional relationships into the status of an independent variable, 
prosecutors in the office would receive instruction from the leadership about 
how to build and manage such relationships, which would in turn further the 
modern goals of the office.  For that reason, I advocate for explicitly 
including professional relationships in the calculus that a reformist leader 
ought to design and promote in her office.45 
Concerning the relationships with the defense bar, recent scholarship 
has pointed out that early career prosecutors tend to have highly adversarial 
relationships with defense attorneys, while more seasoned prosecutors think 
of defenders as their colleagues across the aisle.46  If office leadership set 
expectations for how all prosecutors in the office ought to behave vis-à-vis 
the local defense bar, the high levels of adversarialism shown by junior 
prosecutors would likely dissipate far more quickly. Setting and reinforcing 
 
 44. PAMELA UTZ, SETTLING THE FACTS: DISCRETION AND NEGOTIATION IN CRIMINAL 
COURT (1978); see also Mellon et al., supra note 22, at 60–68.  
 45. The 2017 version of the ABA Standards for the Prosecution Function speak to 
prosecutor relationships beyond the specific case-handling aspect of the prosecutor’s job. 
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 30.  For example, standard 3-3.2(a) sets limits on the cozy 
relationship between prosecutors and law enforcement (“The prosecutor should maintain 
respectful yet independent judgment when interacting with law enforcement personnel.”), and 
standard 3-3.2(b) advises that the prosecutor’s job includes teaching officers about 
compliance (“The prosecutor should promote compliance by law enforcement personnel with 
applicable legal rules, including rules against improper bias.”).  Id.  Standard 3-3.3(d) opens 
the aperture even further, instructing prosecutors on the importance of creating relationships 
with the court and defense counsel: 
The prosecutor should develop and maintain courteous and civil working relationships with 
judges and defense counsel and should cooperate with them in developing solutions to address 
ethical, scheduling, or other issues that may arise in particular cases or generally in the 
criminal justice system.  Prosecutors should cooperate with courts and organized bar 
associations in developing codes of professionalism and civility and should abide by such 
codes that apply in their jurisdiction. 
Id. 
 46. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutor’s 
Syndrome, 56(4) ARIZ. L. REV. 1065 (2014); Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutor 
Risk, Maturation and Wrongful Conviction Practice, 42(3) LAW & SOC. INQ. 648 (2017); 
Stemen & Frederick, supra note 20, at 59.  Contra Laurie L. Levenson, The Problem with 
Cynical Prosecutor’s Syndrome: Rethinking a Prosecutor’s Role in Post-Conviction Cases, 
20 BERK. J. CRIM. L. 335 (2015) (finding high levels of adversarialism among senior 
prosecutors who respond to habeas requests from defense counsel in the Los Angeles County 
DA’s Office). 
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expectations in this regard should happen at the time of hiring and 
throughout.  For example, leadership and senior prosecutors should be wary 
of job applicants who do not manifest a commitment to reformist practices. 
If a newly hired prosecutor shows aggressive prosecution tendencies once 
on the job, leadership and senior attorneys should work hard to smooth out 
those rough edges while the new colleague is still in a probationary period 
of employment.47  
Tone-setting is not just about manifesting a sense of collegiality when 
attorneys are around each other, or about promptly returning phone calls 
(although both of those things are important for information flow and fair 
case resolution); it covers a consistent approach to one’s disclosure 
obligations as well.48  Since much of the scholarship about prosecutorial 
responsibility for wrongful convictions points to disclosure violations as a 
central cause,49 a modern prosecutor would want his or her line prosecutors 
to demonstrate consistently strong respect for the government’s disclosure 
obligations under the U.S. Constitution, the state constitution and relevant 
statutory provisions.  Robust compliance with disclosure obligations and an 
openness to conducting post-conviction inquiries into police and prosecutor 
error would go a long way toward advancing the image of the prosecutor as 
a true minister of justice.50 
When it comes to influencing prosecutor relationships with local law 
enforcement, a calculus that governs filing strategies certainly can have an 
effect.  For example, if legal sufficiency as a filing approach gives way to 
other concerns, fewer cases will be filed initially.51  And filing fewer cases 
means more frequently telling police officers what they do not want to hear. 
Saying “no” to a seasoned police officer can be difficult for any prosecutor; 
 
 47. Stemen & Frederick, supra note 20, at 21 (observing that the Southern County 
prosecutor’s office tried to avoid hiring prosecutors who expressed overly punitive attitudes, 
and used roundtable discussions to “correct” wayward opinions); see also Ronald F. Wright 
& Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutor’s Syndrome, supra note 46 (describing 
techniques that can be used to teach early career prosecutors how to develop a sense of 
proportionality and perspective). Stephanos Bibas’ call for offices to pay attention to values 
at the time of hiring and throughout the prosecutor’s career in the office is in accord.  
Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. 
L. REV. 959, 963 (2009). 
 48. Yaroshefsky & Green, supra note 24. 
 49. See, e.g., BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011). 
 50. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 30, standard 3-5.4 (stating disclosure obligations), 
standard 3-8.1 (stating that the duty to defend conviction is not absolute), standard 3-8.3 
(discussing duty in the face of newly discovered evidence); see also Bruce A. Green & Ellen 
Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 467 (2009); Sklansky, supra note 15. 
 51. Mellon et al., supra note 22, at 60–68. 
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it poses particular problems for early-career prosecutors, who do not yet have 
the confidence in their own judgment and may feel pressured to go along 
even if they have concerns about the underlying police work.52  Here, clear 
guidance about the weight of law enforcement relationships in the 
prosecutorial calculus, communicated by the office leadership, would be 
beneficial.  The early career prosecutor could rely on those standards to 
bolster his own judgment about a case’s deficiencies, or could use those 
standards to explain to the officer why filing would be problematic.  The 
prosecutor would also know that his supervisor would back him up if the 
officer were to complain, because the supervisor would refer to the same 
calculus.  In other words, the prosecutorial calculus of the office would 
provide both the framework that underlies the filing decision and the range 
of communication strategies a prosecutor can use to ease the conversation 
with the officer—or at least to get it started in a productive way. 
 
C.  Is There Room for Flexibility? 
 
A desire for consistency ought not to morph into a sense of rigidity. It 
is no doubt true that guidelines reduce the amount of discretion a decision-
maker possesses; that is the point of having them.  As noted by the National 
Center for State Courts in the context of judges: 
 
At the conceptual level, desired consistency in sentencing 
outcomes clashes with desirable judicial discretion because they 
involve quite different fundamental assumptions. On the one 
hand, consistency posits that the most relevant criteria for 
classifying cases are identifiable and applicable to all cases. On 
the other hand, discretion posits that cases are sufficiently 
different to make it nearly impossible to establish a common 
means of comparison in each individual case.53 
 
The “creative tension”54 between consistency and discretion exists at 
the prosecutorial level as well.  Prosecutors regularly claim that it would be 
impossible to create a handbook of rules to cover all of the situations they 
face and the wide range of cases that cross their desks.  Cases are unique and 
complex, and a system of inflexible rules tends to create an environment in 
 
 52. Wright & Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutor’s Syndrome, supra note 46; 
Stemen & Frederick, supra note 20, at 63–65. 
 53. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ASSESSING CONSISTENCY AND FAIRNESS IN 
SENTENCING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN THREE STATES, supra note 41, at 4. 
 54. Id. at 4. 
2 - Levine_HJCP_V1-2newbio 6/10/2020  10:11 AM 
184 Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment [Vol. 1:2 
which gamesmanship is encouraged, or defense attorneys advocate for 
alternative charges to be filed so that the rules will not apply.  Stringent rules 
also sometimes frustrate judges, whose attempts to achieve creative solutions 
are stymied when prosecutors claim their hands are tied by the office rules.55 
Because consistency and discretion need to co-exist in a professional 
environment, the prosecutorial calculus ought to be understood as a set of 
defaults, rather than as a tight coil.  No prosecutor wants to be “roboticized” 
by office mandates.56  When a prosecutor wants to alter the calculus for 
decision-making in the unusual case, she can explain why to her 
supervisor—in advance—or roundtable it with other members of her team 
or unit to get their take on whether a deviation is necessary or wise. 
Additionally, we would not need to require symmetrical treatment in how 
requests for deviations are handled.  Upward deviations from leniency 
defaults could be strongly discouraged, even as the office remains more open 
to considering downward deviations from standard outcomes that result in 
harsh treatment.57  In a world where prosecutors notoriously want “100% 
discretion and 100% guidance,”58 the flexible prosecutorial calculus 
provides both. 
Moreover, as John Pfaff recently wrote in the context of advocating for 
legislative guidelines to shape prosecutor decision-making, imposing 
guidelines will not cause a sea change in the substance of what prosecutors 
are doing every day.  Guidelines will instead influence the manner in which 
that substance is achieved, by increasing transparency:  
 
Prosecutors already are called on to assess risk, and 
amenability to treatment, and how those relate to both 
incapacitation and deterrence and moral blameworthiness; and 
they are already required to balance all the various competing 
goals of the criminal justice system. And—let us be completely 
clear here—they are already doing so using a proprietary 
actuarial model: the one in their head.59 
 
 55. Stemen & Frederick, supra note 20, at 28–29. 
 56. See Memorandum from Larry Krasner, quoted in BAZELON, supra note 6, at 166. 
 57. Here I agree with John Pfaff that the office commitment to leniency rules ought to 
be firmer than its commitment to stringency rules; that is, we ought to allow more wiggle 
room for prosecutors to seek exceptions to rules that impose severe consequences and less 
wiggle room to deviate from the rules that point toward lenient outcomes.  John Pfaff, supra 
note 32, at 117.  This approach ought to reduce some of the anxiety that a guidelines structure 
sometimes causes in the defender population. 
 58. Stemen & Frederick, supra note 20, at 18 (quoting chief prosecutor in Northern 
County). 
 59. Pfaff, supra note 32, at 117. 
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Subjecting prosecutorial decision-making to an office-wide calculus 
brings the process out of their heads and into the open.  It forces the office 
to consider the value of these respective variables in an ex ante setting, and 
it encourages line prosecutors to have open discussions with each other about 
how factors should be weighed, and when exceptions are warranted. 
 
D.  What about Consistency in Outcomes? 
 
Consistency in outcomes ought to be a goal as well, but it ought to be 
secondary to consistency of process for a number of reasons.  First, due to 
the wide variety of cases, as well as the circumstances of defendants and 
victims, the best we can ever hope to achieve is consistency within a range 
in outcomes, not pinpoint precision.  Second, prosecutors control only those 
outcomes that come from their office—suggested bail amounts, charges, 
sentence recommendations, and plea offers.  Prosecutors do not control the 
actual bail amount set by the court, or the sentence received by a defendant 
either after trial or after an unstructured plea.60  Hence, when faced with 
similar kinds of cases, prosecutors ought to make similar recommendations 
for pre-trial release and sentencing, and to file (or decline to file) similar 
charges.  This is to ensure that the office speaks with one voice about how 
certain behavior is regarded in the jurisdiction, irrespective of which 
prosecutor is assigned the case or which courtroom is adjudicating the 
matter.  But the prosecutorial position is just the beginning.  Final outcomes 
on bail or sentence remain the judge’s responsibility, and judges ought to 
remain accountable for those decisions. 
Third, once an office prioritizes process consistency, the outcomes we 
care about—prosecutors’ bail recommendations, declination decisions, 
diversion recommendations, charges, plea offers, and sentence 
recommendations—should stay within a fairly predictable range.  To the 
extent they occur, deviations from the range would likely flow from 
deviations in thought processes; they would not just spontaneously appear, 
or be driven by personality differences or bias among line prosecutors.  In 
other words, nontraditional recommendations normally would be traceable 
to an approved change in the decisional calculus, where the prosecutor 
making the nontraditional recommendation would have already sought the 
advice/consent of his supervisor or peers.  Because the deviation in thought 
 
 60. This point has been aptly made by Jeff Bellin, who argues that although scholars 
complain that prosecutors have nearly unlimited discretion, prosecutors only get to impose 
their views about bail and sentencing when judges go along with them.  See Jeffrey Bellin, 
The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171 (2019).  Declination of charges, by 
contrast, is one decision that belongs solely to the prosecutor. 
2 - Levine_HJCP_V1-2newbio 6/10/2020  10:11 AM 
186 Hastings Journal of Crime and Punishment [Vol. 1:2 
process would already have been discussed at the office level, a second, 
independent audit at the outcome stage would be unnecessary.61 
Fourth, if prosecutors get the message that their performance will be 
judged based on specific observable outcomes rather than on the thought 
process they employ when making professional decisions, some might be 
inspired to massage the record to make themselves look better.  A focus on 
outcomes can create incentives for line attorneys to appear compliant with 
the office philosophy despite holding obstructionist views, or to appear more 
successful at implementing office policies than the facts would support.  Line 
attorneys might, in essence, try to manipulate the outcome data to hide their 
neglect of process.62  This is not a concern that is unique to prosecutors, to 
be sure.  The current fetish for data-driven policy and rewards has inspired 
other kinds of professionals to fudge data—or to manipulate facts to produce 
better final data—to cover up for underlying failures in the system.63 
 
 61. We need to remain alert to the risk that predetermined factors sometimes provide a 
veneer of objectivity that can mask subjective choices made earlier in the process (a criticism 
of risk assessment tools that are used in the pretrial release context).  See, e.g., Megan 
Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and Bail, 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 21-47 (Erik Luna ed. 2017).  Even so, I believe a 
calculus that guides decision-making by real people in real time has the capacity to be more 
responsive than a rigid set of variables applied by a computer according to a preset algorithm.  
Moreover, because here we are concerned with prosecutors in a reformist office identifying 
the factors and their relative weights, they are less likely than their conventional counterparts 
to blindly incorporate factors that exacerbate patterns of racial and class injustice. 
 62. Data manipulation might include creating false records of attempts to contact the 
victim about a proposed plea strategy, or deeply unenthusiastic arguments before the court in 
support of the office’s official position that the attorney does not endorse.  Short of full 
manipulation or rebellion, we might see a kind of collective “shoulder-shrugging” about the 
new policies and approaches, as opponents just bide their time waiting for the next wave of 
innovative ideas to supplant the current wave.  See, e.g., Lauren Ouziel, Democracy, 
Bureaucracy, and Criminal Justice Reform, 61(2) B.C. L. REV. 524, 567 (2020) (describing 
why it is difficult to impose new policies on a resistant workforce). 
 63. In the law enforcement context, some New York City Police Department officials 
were altering police reports for the purpose of manipulating statistics in the Department’s 
COMSTAT crime tracking system; see Chris Francesci, NYPD report confirms manipulation 
of crime stats, REUTERS (Mar. 9 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-crime-newyork-
statistics/nypd-report-confirms-manipulation-of-crime-stats-idUSBRE82818620120309.  For 
an example that falls outside the criminal justice system, consider the pressures imposed by 
No Child Left Behind and the culture of standardized testing of students to evaluate teacher 
performance, see Valerie Strauss, How and Why Convicted Atlanta Teachers Cheated on 
Standardized Tests, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2015) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
answer-sheet/wp/2015/04/01/how-and-why-convicted-atlanta-teachers-cheated-on-standard 
ized-tests/.  The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission sometimes adopts policies or 
manipulates data reports to hide the fact that its enforcement initiatives have not been 
particularly successful. Jonathan Macey, The Distorting Incentives of the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639 (2010).  Gamesmanship can also 
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Finally, we need to be thoughtful about what outcomes we place in the 
spotlight.  Observers have noted that we have a tendency to value the things 
we measure,64 making those metrics very difficult to abandon later on and 
other data nearly impossible to see.  This insight cautions that leadership 
ought to think carefully about which metrics to employ when evaluating 
attorney compliance with new policies.  Racing to implement a heap of new 
ideas all at one time—with no clear path to gauging meaningful acceptance 
of those ideas among the workforce—can undermine the long-term success 
of even the most promising proposals. 
This caution may be particularly salient in an office that employs people 
of variable abilities (that is, in any prosecutor’s office).  Prosecutors differ in 
their trial skills, their negotiation skills, and their people skills.  Surely they 
will differ in their ability to correctly and swiftly implement any new 
program put forth by the leadership that tries to alter their entrenched ways 
of doing things.  Leaders may struggle with how to respond to good faith 
efforts that fall short, particularly from prosecutors who otherwise possess a 
strong set of skills in the courtroom or with victim groups.  A focus just on 
outcomes—without respect to process—risks alienating and denigrating 
otherwise valuable members of the staff.  
 
Part II: Consistency with Whom? Setting Office-Wide 
Standards While Respecting Localism 
 
Having established that consistency in thought process is the principal 
goal, we next need to decide which set of prosecutors ought to be subject to 
the progressive prosecutor’s calculus.  In this part I argue that every member 
of a prosecutor’s office needs to follow the calculus, irrespective of job 
assignment or level of seniority.  Only office-wide acceptance of the 
prosecutorial calculus can generate more consistency across individual 
prosecutors, across units, and across courtrooms in the jurisdiction.  But the 
elected prosecutor’s reach is more limited when it comes to prosecutors who 
work in other jurisdictions.  Her authority does not and cannot extend outside 
her office (for political and economic reasons).  Moreover, she would be 
wise to steer clear of subjecting her office to statewide norms that are 
inconsistent with the reform agenda.  Efforts to bring the entire state under 
 
occur in the context of national security. See Matt Mazzetti & Mark Apuzzo, Inquiry Weighs 
Whether ISIS Analysis Was Distorted, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2015), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2015/08/26/world/middleeast/pentagon-investigates-allegations-of-skewed-intelligence 
-reports-on-isis.html. 
 64. Donella Meadows, Indicators and Information Systems for Sustainable 
Development, THE SUSTAINABILITY INSTITUTE (Sept. 1998), http://donellameadows.org/wp-
content/userfiles/IndicatorsInformation.pdf. 
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one prosecutorial calculus risk diluting the efforts of reformers before their 
views gain majority acceptance across the state. 
 
A.  How Far Should Consistency Extend within the Office? 
 
State prosecutor’s offices in the United States come in a variety of 
shapes and sizes.  As scholars have observed previously, the assumption that 
all prosecutor offices are large, pyramidal-shaped bureaucracies is false.65 
While the most researched offices can be characterized that way, in fact most 
prosecutor offices in the U.S. consist of the Elected and just a handful of 
other attorneys.  Aside from size, offices vary in the degree to which they 
embrace specialized units (as opposed to general trial teams), as well as in 
their use of horizontal versus vertical approaches to charging and case 
handling.  These variations in size and organizational structure influence the 
pathways through which new messages travel, and the amount of time it 
takes for those messages to filter down.  Despite these differences, reform 
leaders in any kind of office need to reach line attorneys and supervising 
attorneys at every level, and in every assignment, in order for a consistent 
prosecutorial calculus to take hold. 
For example, in offices that contain specialized units to handle certain 
kinds of crimes (sex crimes, white collar crimes, drug crimes, for example),66 
we might expect the leaders of those units to be the primary source of 
information and communication with the unit attorneys.  This would also be 
the case for leaders of general trial teams, or midlevel office supervisors 
(often called “deputy chiefs”) who approve charges and plea offers in various 
courtrooms.  Leaders of these units and teams must be on board with the 
prosecutorial calculus articulated by the new office leadership; if they 
contradict or second-guess it, they will create confusion among the line 
attorneys who work below them and undermine the elected leader’s 
authority.67 
 
 65. Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3D, 102(4) J. CRIM. L. AND 
CRIMINOLOGY 1119 (2012); Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Place Matters in Prosecution 
Research, 14(2) OHIO STATE J. OF CRIM. LAW 675 (2017). 
 66. See generally Dawn Beichner & Cassia Spohn, Prosecutorial Charging Decisions in 
Sexual Assault Cases: Examining the Impact of a Specialized Prosecution Unit, 16 CRIM. 
JUST. POL’Y REV. 461 (2005); David C. Pyrooz et al., Gang-related Homicide Charging 
Decisions: The Implementation of a Specialized Prosecution Unit in Los Angeles, 22 CRIM. 
JUST. POL’Y REV. 2 (2011).  
 67. Larry Krasner of Philadelphia likewise endorses providing “multi-generational 
training” to his staff.  BAZELON, supra note 5, at 167.  See also Beth McCann, Courtney Oliva 
& Ronald Wright, Prosecutor Office Culture and Diversion Programs (2019) (unpublished 
manuscript on file with author) (discussing what it takes to secure line prosecutors’ 
cooperation with new diversion programs). 
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If the office leadership is concerned about the willingness of 
supervisory level prosecutors to go along with the reformist program, radical 
steps—like demotions and firing—might ensue.  Such was the path taken by 
Larry Krasner when he assumed leadership of the Philadelphia District 
Attorney’s Office and faced resistance from many career prosecutors who 
found themselves under his command.  He fired 31 attorneys who could not 
or would not subscribe to his vision of how to do the job differently.68 
Resistance need not provoke such a severe response, of course.  A milder 
approach would be to realize, as Lauren Ouziel has recently observed, that 
long-time career servants of the office might be resistant to new ways of 
doing things simply because they prefer to leave politics to the politicians. 
Moreover, many career civil servants have developed “system justifications” 
to explain and fortify established work patterns.  If newly elected leaders 
were to invite recalcitrant veterans to participate in conversations about why 
new approaches are necessary (rather than stripping them of authority at the 
first sign of resistance), they might ultimately be able to get the veterans on 
board.69 
Whether the response to resistors appears harsh, mild, or somewhere in 
between, the office leadership should not automatically squelch unit-level 
initiatives that make sense for a particular unit.  Conceivably, unit leaders 
might want to tailor, or add to, the general office calculus to make more 
specific guidelines for the kinds of crimes the unit handles.70  That is, a unit 
that addresses drug crimes would need to eliminate the “consult the victim” 
factor in the general office calculus, whereas the sex crimes unit might want 
to add more weight to that factor than the general calculus provides.  Scrutiny 
of law enforcement tactics for constitutional issues might loom large in the 
drug unit but be less prominent in a white-collar crime division.  Unit 
adjustments should be permitted and welcomed, as long as they make sense 
for the caseload and are approved by the office leadership.  These kinds of 
variations should be discouraged among the general felony trial teams, where 
the composition of their respective caseloads is the same; no unit-specific 
crimes justify adjustments in the overall calculus at the trial team level.  
 
 68. Krasner famously said of this decision, “When the pirates take over the ship, some 
of the crew is going over the side.”  BAZELON, supra note 5, at 161.  Bazelon likewise notes 
that when Kim Foxx took over the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office in Chicago, she 
fired three dozen lawyers who were promoted by the previous chief prosecutor.  BAZELON, 
supra note 5, at 368. 
 69. Ouziel, supra note 62. 
 70. See Stemen & Frederick, supra note 20, at 19–31 (describing the creation of unit 
level rules in Southern County that supplement or help to operationalize the general office 
policy to “do justice” or “do the right thing”). 
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In offices that embrace a horizontal model of prosecution, where there 
is one charging bureau that files all cases for the office, the prosecutorial 
calculus for charging (the factors that ought to be weighed in the decision, 
plus the weight that each factor deserves) should apply to all attorneys in that 
bureau, but it does not stop there.  While prosecutors elsewhere in the office 
are not filing cases, they do handle those cases at later stages.  They therefore 
need to understand and adopt the calculus in determining bail 
recommendations and plea offers, to make sure they are not undercutting the 
filing team.  If they are regularly seeking to undercut the filing team because 
cases are not nearly as strong as the filing team believes, this ought to prompt 
an office-wide conversation to bring the two groups into alignment.  In 
offices that embrace a vertical model of prosecution, each prosecutor files 
his or her own set of cases and then handles them throughout the process; 
the calculus for filing, bail and plea offers would need to be front and center 
for each attorney with a similar caseload.  Under either model the point is to 
coordinate the prosecutorial calculus at various stages, such that early 
decision-makers engage in downstream thinking about the consequences of 
their choices, and later decision-makers do not undermine earlier ones 
purposefully or inadvertently.  
 
B. What Reaction Can We Expect from the Defense Bar to 
Increased Consistency? 
 
If an office-wide prosecutorial calculus takes hold, there will be more 
conformity across the board in terms of case treatment, which could be both 
positive and negative for defense attorneys who work with the office.  On 
the plus side, defense attorneys will receive, and should come to anticipate, 
more or less the same treatment from whichever prosecutor is handling a 
given case.  That, in turn, should reduce disparities that might otherwise stem 
from any particular prosecutor’s idiosyncrasies, background, and biases, and 
should increase certainty in plea negotiations.  On the negative side, once the 
calculus is in place, creative defense lawyering might fall by the wayside, as 
defense attorneys come to realize that they cannot make much headway by 
pointing to individual features of clients or cases.  This loss would be 
particularly acute when substantive justice concerns suggest a particular 
defendant ought to receive better treatment than other offenders in the same 
category. 
Conceiving of the calculus as a set of defaults rather than rigid rules 
should allow for exceptions in exceptional cases.  But the objective would 
be to keep those exceptions fairly limited, to move away from the “just this 
once” mentality that takes hold in so many cases today and renders 
exceptions a regular feature of the landscape for anyone who asks for them. 
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Furthermore, by establishing the calculus up front, we signal that exceptions, 
when granted, should include documentation and discussion; they should no 
longer emerge from backroom deals or off-the-record phone calls.  In so 
doing, we could limit the ability of biases—both explicit and implicit—to 
influence the outcomes of cases, biases that have long privileged defendants 
of means and disadvantaged those from vulnerable groups.71 
 
C.  Should We (Can We) Aim for Consistency Across 
Jurisdictions? 
 
Identifying disparities across counties (in terms of how major crimes 
are handled) has been a mainstay of criminology research; this variation has 
emerged even among serious felony cases.72  A high degree of localism exists 
because each prosecutor’s office has roots in a specific political and 
economic ecosystem, and no two ecosystems are alike.  The ecosystem 
includes such features as the strength of the local defense bar and the 
orientation of the local bench toward encouraging plea bargaining.73 
Additionally, caseload size, prosecutors’ trust in the local police force, the 
demographic character of the jurisdiction, funding sources, and the values of 
the underlying community can all influence policies adopted by the 
prosecutor’s office and the prosecutor’s ability to get the job done.74  As 
Levine and Wright have noted previously, “Because the prosecutor’s office 
is only one institution in a much larger community of socio-legal actors with 
competing interests, these external relationships bear heavily on the results 
that prosecutors tend to get with their discretionary power.”75  These 
relationships tend to shape a range of decisions made by prosecutors, 
including filing standards,76 approach to disclosure obligations,77 and plea 
bargaining strategies.78 
 
 71. See ABA STANDARDS supra note 30, at standard 3-1.6 (stating that the prosecutor 
ought to strive to eliminate reliance on explicit and implicit bias wherever possible). 
 72. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Ulmer et al., Prosecutorial Discretion and the Imposition of 
Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 44 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 427 (2007) (documenting the 
correlation between community demographics and prosecutorial willingness to file charges 
with mandatory minimum sentences); Wright, supra note 18. 
 73. UTZ, supra note 44; see also ROY FLEMMING ET AL., THE CRAFT OF JUSTICE: POLITICS 
AND WORK IN CRIMINAL COURT COMMUNITIES (1992) (arguing that prosecutor leadership 
style needs to account for office status relative to the defense bar and the bench). 
 74. Mellon et al., supra note 22, at 6–68. 
 75. Levine & Wright, supra note 65, at 1130. 
 76. Mellon et al., supra note 22, at 60–68. 
 77. Yaroshefsky & Green, supra note 24. 
 78. UTZ, supra note 44. 
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Given this degree of local variation in the political and economic 
landscape, is it possible or smart for reform prosecutors to expect consistency 
across jurisdictions?  Probably not, for two reasons: First, to the extent it has 
triumphed, the reformist prosecutorial agenda has achieved validation 
through local popular election.  But the elected reformer DA received 
majority support in her district only; she thus has no mandate or authority to 
impose her agenda elsewhere.  Second, modern goals are likely to be diluted 
if made to fit within a larger statewide organization or made to compete for 
a place on the state legislative platform, assuming the modern agenda is the 
minority position in the state.  It will take a very long time (if it happens at 
all) for that agenda to move into the majority spotlight; in the interim, it will 
almost always lose to the conventional majority position.  In that setting, 
reformist ideas would remain just ideas—remaining at odds with actual 
policy because the conservative headwinds would remain dominant.79 
Despite those headwinds, I would encourage reformist prosecutors to 
speak about their ideas openly and enthusiastically outside their own 
jurisdictions.  Conventional prosecutors have long proselytized the benefits 
of a strict law and order approach to justice; it’s time for the counter-
narrative to claim space on the airwaves as well.  Over the past decade, the 
soundness of new approaches to criminal justice has become apparent to 
people on all points of the political spectrum, albeit for different reasons. 
Discontent with the status quo has thus provided fertile ground for innovative 
ideas to take root in both urban and rural areas, in coastal regions and 
Midwestern plains.  Reform prosecutors need to keep the conversation 




Reform-minded prosecutors ought to emphasize the value of 
consistency in the prosecutorial thought process, what I have called the 
“prosecutorial calculus.”  With consistency of process at the forefront, line 
prosecutors would make decisions about declination, diversion, charging, 
 
 79. Recently, two self-identified progressive prosecutors have left their statewide district 
attorneys associations, due to irreconcilable conflicts in policy.  See Chris Palmer, Philly DA 
Larry Krasner withdraws office from statewide prosecutors group, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 
(Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/crime/philadelphia-da-district-attor 
ney-larry-krasner-withdraws-pdaa-20181116.html and Evan Sernoffsky, Central California 
DA quits state association over its opposition to criminal justice reforms, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 
16, 2020), https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/Central-California-DA-quits-state-asso 
ciation-14981879.php.  For a recent explanation of the counter position (that prosecutors 
ought to transcend localism and apply the same standards throughout the state), see Bruce A. 
Green and Rebecca Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution, 69 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 805–
62 (2020). 
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bail, plea offers, and relationships with other criminal justice professionals 
in accordance with standards set by the office leadership.  They would retain 
the ability to seek exceptions in exceptional cases but would mostly speak 
with one voice about the office’s values and priorities.  While consistency of 
outcomes would likely flow from consistency of thought process, it would 
not be regarded as an independent measure of prosecutorial compliance with 
the leadership’s vision.  The prosecutorial calculus would also help to 
operationalize the office’s commitment to transparency and equal treatment 
of defendants, which are hallmarks of the reformist vision. 
I have also argued that, while consistency ought to be a guiding 
principle, it ought not to transform itself into rigidity.  Justice is at its peak 
when laws and procedures reflect a balance of generality and specificity.80 
In the case of the prosecutor’s office, this offers two important lessons.  First, 
internal office guidelines resonate more deeply and successfully with the line 
attorneys when they appear to support norms emanating from below.  Where 
there is a strong connection between policies dictated from the top and 
workplace patterns that make sense to courtroom attorneys, line attorneys 
will be more inclined to believe that such guidelines provide proper 
instruction for decisions they make every day.81  Relatedly, hydraulic 
pressures exist in any bureaucratic system; if the office forces consistency in 
a heavy-handed way that seems out of step with how line prosecutors want 
to do their jobs, urges and pressures for specificity will bubble up to the 
surface and inspire employees to evade office norms or even engage in 
outright rebellion. 
Finally, when considering the success of the prosecutorial calculus, 
office leaders need to remain alert to the inherent limitations found in the 
population charged with implementing it.  Prosecutors are actual people, 
replete with a range of motivations, talents, and career aspirations.82  Implicit 
biases and system justifications may get in the way of even the well-meaning 
prosecutor’s amenability to new ideas, at least at first.  Lasting change is 
likely to take time and patience, two traits that are in short supply during 
electoral cycles that arise every four years.  But undoing the harms imposed 
by past generations in furtherance of a more compassionate, responsible 




 80. Maggie Blackhawk, Equity Outside the Courts, 121 COLUM. L. REV. __ (2020) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 81. Beth McCann, et al., Prosecutor Office Culture and Diversion Programs (2019) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 82. Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, Career Motivations of State Prosecutors, 86 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1667 (2018). 
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